https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/ 2026-04-04T07:39:43+00:00 https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/ https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/_media/wiki/dokuwiki.svg text/html 2017-05-09T08:01:06+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/0-setup?rev=1494316866&do=diff IPv6 Security Lab Objective Using a dual stack topology, this lab investigates securing the router and the routing infrastructure for the network. Lab Topology The initial lab topology sets up 6 autonomous systems, each with four routers. In each AS, one router is the border router (for connecting to transit providers), one router is the core router (representing the rest of the network operator’s core network), one router is a peering router (for connecting to private peers and IXPs), and o… text/html 2017-04-10T05:31:41+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/1-routing?rev=1491802301&do=diff IPv6 Security Lab - Routing Setting up OSPF ---------- ### Dual stack OSPF in each AS In each AS configure OSPF routing. As we are running a dual stack network, we need to run OSPFv2 for IPv4 routes and OSPFv3 for IPv6 routes. This means setting up the OSPF process, marking text/html 2017-04-10T05:32:10+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/2-securing-router?rev=1491802330&do=diff IPv6 Security Lab - Securing the Router Basic Best Practice ---------- ### Getting used to IPv6 show commands in IOS Try the following IPv6 show commands: show ipv6 interface show ipv6 neighbors show ipv6 route show ipv6 routers show ipv6 ospf neighbors show ipv6 ospf rib show ipv6 traffic show bgp ipv6 unicast summary show ipv6 ? text/html 2017-05-10T23:53:05+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/3-traffic-filters?rev=1494460385&do=diff IPv6 Security Lab - Traffic Filters ### Configuring IPv6 Traffic Filters We now configure a traffic filter to only allow traffic from just your address block out of your network (this is BCP38 requirement). Note this configuration goes on the border text/html 2017-05-11T08:35:23+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/4-routing-security?rev=1494491723&do=diff IPv6 Security Lab - Routing Protocol Security OSPF neighbour authentication ---------- ### Configuring Neighbour Security for OSPFv2 (for IPv4) Network operators consider it more and more important to turn on neighbour authentication inside their networks as attacks on infrastructure increase and operators seek to use all available tools to secure their networks. text/html 2017-04-10T05:36:55+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/5-netflow?rev=1491802615&do=diff IPv6 Security Lab - Netflow Exploring Netflow ---------- Netflow identifies anomalous and security-related network activity by tracking network flows. NetFlow data can be viewed and analysed via the command line interface (CLI), or the data can be exported to a commercial or freeware NetFlow collector for aggregation and analysis. NetFlow collectors, through long-term trending, can provide network behaviour and usage analysis. NetFlow functions by performing analysis on specific attributes … text/html 2017-04-10T05:37:26+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/6-rtbh?rev=1491802646&do=diff IPv6 Security Lab - RTBH Exploring Remotely Triggered Black Hole Filtering ---------- ### Background RTBH, as it is known as, is a commonly used technique to assist with the mitigation of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Remotely triggered blackhole filtering is a technique that provides the ability to drop undesirable traffic at the ingress into the network. RTBH provides a method for quickly dropping undesirable traffic at the edge of the network, based on either source addresses o… text/html 2017-04-10T05:29:47+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/address-plan?rev=1491802187&do=diff Address Space Allocation This document describes the IP address plan we will use for this set of workshop exercises. Wherever possible the plan tries to replicate real life as closely as possible. The IPv4 address space used in these exercises is from subnets of 100.64.0.0/10 which is an [IPv4 Shared Address]( text/html 2017-10-12T07:53:40+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/agenda?rev=1507794820&do=diff Agenda Time Schedule Session 1 09:00 - 10:30 Break 10:30 - 11:00 Session 2 11:00 - 13:00 Lunch 13:00 - 14:00 Session 3 14:00 - 15:30 Break 15:30 - 16:00 Session 4 16:00 - 17:30 Instructors FL First Name Organisation text/html 2017-05-12T05:42:29+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/breaking-news-1?rev=1494567749&do=diff Breaking News!! We interrupt this program with breaking news! The nefarious hacker group Obscura has posted a new video today claiming to have seized control of electricity smart meters and are threatening shut down the power in an unspecified country in 24 hours from now. With over ten countries having deployed smart meters nationally to improve energy efficiency and streamline energy billing, this threat has government officials scrambling to find out where the threat has emerged. text/html 2017-05-12T05:42:51+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/breaking-news-2?rev=1494567771&do=diff Breaking News!! We interrupt this program with breaking news! The nefarious hacker group Obscura has posted a new video today claiming to have seized control of electricity smart meters and are threatening shut down the power in an unspecified country in 24 hours from now. With over ten countries having deployed smart meters nationally to improve energy efficiency and streamline energy billing, this threat has government officials scrambling to find out where the threat has emerged. text/html 2017-05-08T02:44:55+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/lab-access?rev=1494211495&do=diff Lab Access Instructions Introduction ---------- This lab runs on a virtualised environment for Cisco IOS called “Dynamips”. To join the network which the lab environment is on, associate your laptop with the wireless network called ITU-TOT text/html 2017-04-10T05:36:14+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/lab-ipsec?rev=1491802574&do=diff IPSec Lab In this lab we will configure IPSec tunnels between pairs of access routers. We will ensure that the traffic for one pair of IPv4 and one pair of IPv6 prefixes is encrypted while traffic between another pair of prefixes is unencrypted. This will allow us to see the difference. text/html 2017-05-08T11:28:17+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/participants?rev=1494242897&do=diff Participants Name Country MD Sazder Rahman Bangladesh Tanjara Binte Ansar Bangladesh Asif Riyadh Lodi Bangladesh Md. Golam Sarowar Bangladesh Md. Pervez Sarwar Bangladesh MD Suhardi Brunei Darussalam PG Alias PG Hidup Brunei Darussalam text/html 2017-10-12T07:52:20+00:00 Anonymous (anonymous@undisclosed.example.com) https://bgp4all.com.au/pfs/training/itu-ipv6-2017/start?rev=1507794740&do=diff Internet and IPv6 Infrastructure Security Program Workshop Goals This five-day IPv6 Security Workshop, teaching IPv6 Security * Internet and IPv6 Infrastructure Security Target Audience Policy makers, regulators, and technical staff involved in the Internet.